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ICG CrisisWatch

by Seth 01/07/08

CrisisWatch N°53, 2 January 2008

Seven actual or potential conflict situations around the world deteriorated in December 2007, according to the new issue of CrisisWatch, released today.

In Pakistan, the 27 December assassination of former prime minister and opposition leader Benazir Bhutto threw the country deeper into political turmoil. Ensuing street violence killed some 50.

Credible reports of election rigging in Kenya’s 27 December presidential polls sparked violence in several parts of the country. Incumbent President Mwai Kibaki was reinstated despite an early lead by opponent Raila Odinga. Over 300 were killed by vigilante groups and police.

Two suicide bombers killed up to 60 in UN and government buildings in Algiers on 11 December, with five more killed in further attacks. Fighting worsened in Chad between Khartoum-backed rebels and the military.

The political crisis in Lebanon deepened with the 12 December assassination of General Francois Hajj and the presidency vacant since President Emile Lahoud’s term ended on 23 November.

The situation also deteriorated in the Basque Country (Spain) and Kyrgyzstan. The situation improved in Nepal in December as the Maoists rejoined the government on 30 December.

For January 2008, CrisisWatch identifies Kenya and Pakistan as Conflict Risk Alerts, or situations at particular risk of new or significantly escalated conflict in the coming month.

For January 2008, CrisisWatch identifies the DR Congo as a Conflict Resolution Opportunity with a government-sponsored peace conference for the Kivus due 6 January.

DECEMBER 2007 TRENDS

Deteriorated Situations Algeria, Basque Country (Spain), Chad, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Pakistan Improved Situations Nepal Unchanged Situations Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chechnya (Russia), Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Cyprus, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ethiopia/Eritrea, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, India (non-Kashmir), Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel/Occupied Territories, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Liberia, Macedonia, Mali, Mauritania, Moldova, Morocco, Myanmar/Burma, Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan), Niger, Nigeria, North Caucasus (non-Chechnya), Northern Ireland (UK), North Korea, Peru, Philippines, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Somaliland (Somalia), Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Western Sahara, Zimbabwe

JANUARY 2008 OUTLOOK Conflict Risk Alerts Kenya, Pakistan

Conflict Resolution Opportunity DR Congo

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Iran welcomes new US intelligence report

by Seth 12/04/07

Iran welcomes new US intelligence report
By ALI AKBAR DAREINI, Associated Press Writer TEHRAN,
Iran - Iran's foreign minister on Tuesday welcomed the U.S. decision to "correct" its claim that Tehran has an active nuclear weapons program, state-run radio reported.
Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki was referring to a U.S. intelligence assessment released Monday that reversed earlier claims that Iran had restarted its weapons program in 2005 after suspending it in 2003.
"It's natural that we welcome ... countries that correct their views realistically which in the past had questions and ambiguities about (Iran's nuclear activities)," Mottaki said.
The new U.S. intelligence report Monday concluded that Iran's nuclear weapons development program has been halted since the fall of 2003 because of international pressure.
The finding is part of a National Intelligence Estimate on Iran that also cautions that Tehran continues to enrich uranium and still could develop a bomb between 2010 and 2015 if it decided to do so.
The conclusion that Iran's weapons program was still frozen, through at least mid-2007, represents a sharp turnaround from the previous intelligence assessment in 2005.
Then, U.S. intelligence agencies believed Tehran was determined to develop a nuclear weapons capability and was continuing its weapons development program.
The new report concludes that Iran's decisions are rational and pragmatic, and that Tehran is more susceptible to diplomatic and financial pressure than previously thought.
"Tehran's decision to halt its nuclear weapons program suggests it is less determined to develop nuclear weapons than we have been judging since 2005," says the unclassified summary of the secret report.
The findings come at a time of escalating tensions between the United States and Iran, which President Bush has labeled part of an "axis of evil," along with Iraq and North Korea.
At an Oct. 17 news conference, Bush said, "If you're interested in avoiding World War III, it seems like you ought to be interested in preventing them (Iran) from having the knowledge necessary to make a nuclear weapon."
Rand Beers, who resigned from Bush's National Security Council just before the Iraq war, said the report should derail any appetite for war on the administration's part, and should reinvigorate regional diplomacy.
"The new NIE throws cold water on the efforts of those urging military confrontation with Iran," he said.
However, Israel's defense minister said Tuesday that Israeli intelligence believes Iran is still trying to develop a nuclear weapon. "There are differences in the assessments of different organizations in the world about this, and only time will tell who is right," Defense Minister Ehud Barak told Army Radio.
On Monday, senior intelligence officials said they failed to detect Iran's fall 2003 halt in nuclear weapons development in time to reflect it in the 2005 estimate.
One of the officials said Iran is the most challenging country to spy on — harder even than North Korea, a notoriously closed society.
"We put a lot more collection assets against this," the official said, "but gaps remain."
The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the subject. U.S. National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley, said the risk of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon remains "a serious problem."
"The bottom line is this: For that strategy to succeed, the international community has to turn up the pressure on Iran with diplomatic isolation, United Nations sanctions, and with other financial pressure and Iran has to decide it wants to negotiate a solution," Hadley said. Bush was briefed on the 100-page document on Nov. 28.
National Intelligence Estimates represent the most authoritative written judgments of all 16 U.S. spy agencies.
Congress and other executive agencies were briefed Monday, and foreign governments will be briefed beginning Tuesday, the officials said.
The intelligence officials said they do not know all the reasons why Iran halted its weapons program, or what might trigger its resumption.
They said they are confident that diplomatic and political pressure played a key role, but said the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Libya's termination of its nuclear program and the implosion of the illegal nuclear smuggling network run by Pakistani scientist A.Q. Khan also might have influenced Tehran.
To develop a nuclear weapon, Iran needs to design and engineer a warhead, obtain enough fissile material, and build a delivery vehicle such as a missile.
The intelligence agencies now believe Iran halted warhead engineering four years ago and as of mid-2007 had not restarted it. But Iran is still enriching uranium for its civilian nuclear reactors that produce electricity.
That leaves open the possibility that fissile material could be diverted to covert nuclear sites to produce highly enriched uranium for a warhead.
This national intelligence estimate was originally due in the spring of 2007 but was delayed because the agencies wanted more confidence their findings were accurate, given the inaccuracy of the 2002 intelligence estimate of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction program.
Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller, D-W. Va., said the report showed "a level of independence from political leadership that was lacking in the recent past."
Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell decided last month that key judgments of NIEs should not be declassified and released.
The intelligence officials said an exception was made in this case because the last assessment of Iran's nuclear program in 2005 has influenced public debate about U.S. policy toward Iran, and must be updated to reflect the latest findings.
___ Associated Press writers Pamela Hess in Washington and Matti Friedman in Jerusalem contributed to this report.

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Turkey-Iraq: The War Drums Beat Loudly

by Seth Kane 10/23/07

Turkey-Iraq: The War Drums Beat Loudly

Rene Wadlow

On 17 October 2007, the Turkish Parliament voted to authorize the government to send troops into northern Iraq against Kurdish rebel camps. This vote of Parliament came to reinforce a 9 October statement of the government allowing its troops to cross the Iraqi border. On Saturday, 20 October, a Kurdish attack killed 10 Turkish soldiers already massed at the frontier. Turkish leaders and military authorities have met on 21 October, Sunday, to plan for action. On the Iraqi side of the frontier, there have been large demonstrations of support for Kurdistan and warnings that the Kurdish population will fight if Turkish troops enter. On both sides of the frontier, the drums of war are beating loudly.

The US Government has called for calm, and no doubt European Ministries of Foreign Affairs have dusted off their files on the the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK). However, it is up to non-governmental organizations to see what avenues of communication they have to both Kurds and Turks to see what possibilities of negotiation exist so that violence does not increase.


The Government of Turkey is under pressure from the military and part of the population to do something after a land mine exploded on Sunday 7 October some 25 kilometres inside Turkey from the Iraq border in south-eastern Sirnak Province. The mine killed 13 soldiers, and the Army is frustrated by the fact that PKK fighters can carry out attacks on Turkish soil and then cross the frontier into Iraqi Kurdistan. The Turkish Government is under pressure to please the Army after the Army accepted the election of former Foreign Minister Abdullal Gul as President. Some, especially in the military, felt that Gul's Islamic convictions put the secular nature of the Turkish state in danger. There was even talk of a military coup to prevent Gul's election. While these objections to Gul have calmed, the Turkish military can expect some favours in return for their moderation on the political front. Punitive raids into Iraq might be such a favour.


On 15 February 1999, Abdullah Ocalan, the leader of the PKK, was kidnapped on his way from the Greek embassy in Nairobi, Kenya to the airport and flown back to Turkey where he was tried and sentenced to death. The death penalty was commuted into life imprisonment in 2002 following the abolition of the death penalty in Turkey in time of peace. He is kept in solitary confinement on the Turkish prison island of Imrali. During his trial, he called upon the PKK to end armed violence and to take up an organized civil struggle.

Although the PKK was created to bring about equality for Kurds in Turkey, there was always a Pan-Kurd dimension to Ocalan¹s thinking. As there are Kurds in Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, there have always been hopes among some Kurds for a united Kurdistan. What to the Kurds is a hope is a fear to the governments of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

Current events need to be seen against the background and history of Kurdish movements in all four countries. Governments have played Kurdish factions one against another. While the Kurdish provinces of Iraq are calmer today than other parts of the country, the tensions among Kurdish groups for power, between Kurds and minorities in the Kurdish areas, and between Iraq Kurdistan's Government and the central Government of Iraq are not far below the surface.


Kurdish nationalism is of relatively recent date. During the Ottoman period, religion was the main factor of identification and division. Kurds and Turks were grouped together in the 'house of Islam' while others, Christians and Jews, existed in a largely self-governing millet system. The Kurdish question is an element of the break up of the Ottoman Empire into the states of Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran. As Turkey was the heart of the Empire, the transition and ideological elements were strongest in Turkey where personal identity became a key factor in the transformation of traditional society where identities were religiously determined at the communal level to a modern society where the aim was to define an individual¹s identity at the State level. At the State level, there are only Turkish citizens or citizens of Turkey. The dilemma is whether all citizens are also ethnic Turks or whether a citizen of Turkey can also have another ethnic identity while still having all the rights of a citizen.


During the first period of the Turkish State (1924 to 1945), everyone (residing within Turkey) was regarded as a Turk even if he himself was not conscious of it. The theory was that as the Turks had come from Central Asia, they had absorbed all prior inhabitants, even those, like the Kurds who lived in isolated mountain areas and spoke a non-Turkic language. The State propaganda through history teaching and linguistic studies was to insist that everyone was a Turk, even those who had forgotten the fact. The Kurds were "mountain Turks."


As it often happens, when history and linguistic identities are used for political ends, counter-history and linguistics come to the fore. Thus the intellectual Kurds started studying their history, and little by little, an intellectual structure of Kurdishness developed, basically after the Second World War. Although most Kurds thought of themselves in narrow tribal/clanic terms, among intellectuals and politically-aware individuals, a Pan-Kurdish identity started to grow and stressed the kinship with the Kurds living in Iraq, Iran and Syria. In the 1920s and 1930s, there had been short-lived but violent Kurdish revolts against the centralizing tendencies of the Turkish government. But these revolts were usually led by tribal chiefs or charismatic religious leaders.


It was not until 1984 that the PKK, made up largely of youth, influenced by Marxism, independent of traditional Kurdish tribal leaders, started a program of violence against the Turkish State and against Kurds who were considered allies of the Turkish government. The PKK was strong in the poor mountainous areas where the State authorities had difficulty to penetrate. The PKK had military bases in northern Iraq and training camps in Syria.


The Turkish Government's first reaction was to consider this violence as terrorism and to treat it as a military problem to be solved with military means. This is still the attitude of many political figures and most of the military. But after years of violence, with many dead and villages destroyed, the PKK is still there. However, the PKK does not necessarily represent the majority of the Kurdish people.


Within Turkey, there is a need for further democratization and devolution of decision-making powers, and the development of dialogue. Not all officials, political parties, and military officers are willing to accommodate moves toward further democratization and pluralism in Turkish society. At the same time, there is a tendency among many Kurdish radicals to pursue a policy based on what amounts to exclusive ethnic nationalism. There are no easy solutions, and time will not heal by itself. There must be leadership both among Turks and Kurds to break out of the sterility of violence and build a base for a democratic and liberal society. Events in Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will all influence each other. Preventive measures are needed from the United Nations, national governments and non-governmental organizations.

Rene Wadlow is the Representative to the United Nations, Geneva, of the Association of World Citizens, and the editor of the online journal of world politics www.transnational-perspectives.org

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ICG on Sudan - the Abyei conflict

by Seth 10/16/07

Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock

Nairobi/Brussels, 12 October 2007: The SPLM decision on 11 October to suspend its participation in the Government of National Unity demonstrates the urgent need for the international community to re-engage on implementation of the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) lest Sudan’s North-South war resume.

Mounting tensions in the oil-rich Abyei region are the most dangerous threat to reignite that war, as the latest report from the International Crisis Group, Sudan: Breaking the Abyei Deadlock,* demonstrates. It examines the dispute over Abyei, the most volatile aspect of the CPA, the deal that ended the country’s twenty-year civil war in which over two million people died. The ruling National Congress Party (NCP) is violating the CPA by refusing the “final and binding” ruling of the Abyei Boundary Commission, leaving an administrative and political vacuum.

Negotiations with the Sudan People’s Liberation Army/Movement are stalled, and both sides are building up their military forces around Abyei. To protect Sudan’s fragile peace, implementation of the CPA’s Abyei Protocol needs to be top of the agenda.

“The international community has to re-engage across the board on CPA implementation but nowhere more urgently than Abyei, where the risk of a return to war is rising dramatically,” says David Mozersky, Crisis Group’s Horn of Africa Project Director.

Abyei is geographically, ethnically and politically caught between northern and southern Sudan. The CPA granted the disputed territory, which has a significant percentage of Sudan’s oil reserves, a special administrative status and a 2011 referendum to decide whether to join what might then be an independent South. The sequencing of implementation was clearly set out in the Abyei Protocol, beginning with border demarcation. However, the situation continues to fester, mainly due to NCP intransigence.

The risk of renewed conflict must be addressed on both national and local levels. The CPA’s guarantors, led by the U.S., must send a strong, coordinated message to the NCP that it is legally bound by the Boundary Commission report and expected to implement it. To reduce the risk of conflict, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) should work with the parties to establish a demilitarised zone in Abyei. Space for dialogue between the Ngok Dinka and Misseriya communities must also be created to build much needed trust.

Oil plays a strong role in the impasse. The parties need to open a new dialogue on oil issues, including a plan to establish a revenue sharing agreement between North and South beyond 2011, for the contingency that Abyei votes to join an independent South.

“What happens in Abyei is likely to determine whether Sudan consolidates the peace or returns to war”, says François Grignon, Crisis Group’s Africa Program Director. “Progress there would unlock a broader set of problems challenging CPA implementation, just as renewed violence would likely break the CPA - with tragic consequences”.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635. Giulia Previti (Washington) +1 202 785 1601

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ICG media release on Burma

by William Lincoln 10/16/07

Myanmar: Time for Urgent Action

New York/Brussels, 25 September 2007: United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon should hold urgent talks with the foreign ministers of China, India and Singapore, the current ASEAN chair, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly and lead a joint attempt to encourage peaceful dialogue in Myanmar/Burma. China, India, and ASEAN should back Ban Ki-moon’s call on the authorities in Myanmar to exercise restraint in the face of growing peaceful protests and put their full weight behind UN efforts to find a solution to the country’s political crisis.

“The regime has a long history of violent reactions to peaceful demonstrations,” said Gareth Evans, President of the International Crisis Group. “If serious loss of life is to be averted, those UN members with influence over the government are going to have to come together fast.”

Only China, India, and, to a lesser degree, ASEAN have any influence on the military regime. China has very close economic and political links with Myanmar, while India has developed strong military ties. Both would suffer from worsening instability there, as they did after the violent August 1988 military crackdown. In the past, the military junta has fired on peaceful protestors or used vigilante groups to attack them. Demonstrations in recent days have reached a country-wide scale where such action could cause massive loss of life.

The Secretary-General has been using his good offices to deal with the political stalemate in Myanmar. His Special Envoy for Myanmar, Professor Ibrahim Gambari, has been trying to negotiate the release of opposition leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and to encourage dialogue between the military and the National League for Democracy. These efforts have made little progress as the military authorities have moved forward with a constitutional drafting process that will cement them in power despite evident public opposition to their rule.

China, India and ASEAN should communicate to the military that a repeat of the 1988 violence would be unacceptable and would lead to serious consequences, including action by the UN Security Council. China and Russia should warn Myanmar that they would support full consideration of the situation there by the Security Council, as well as a possible adoption of a Security Council Resolution, if the military use force against protestors.

The Security Council should re-affirm its support of the Secretary-General’s good offices mission and urge Myanmar’s leaders to work with the Special Envoy to map out measurable steps towards economic and political reform. Those countries with close ties to Myanmar should urge the military to release all political prisoners, including Daw Aung Sang Suu Kyi; take steps to alleviate economic hardship and introduce serious reforms; and start a real dialogue with the opposition.

Contacts: Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) +32 (0) 2 541 1635 Giulia Previti (Washington) +1 202 785 1601. To contact Crisis Group media please go to http://www.crisisgroup.org.

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